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~nlication in Virginia 
Prior to early in the twentieth century, working 
men were forced to accept conditions as laid down by 
their employers. It was largely essential that they 
work under whatever circumstances their employers saw 
fit to apply--their jobs were dependent upon their 
submission. 
Each job was characterized as having certain risks. 
These so called "ris~s'of the business" had to be as-
sumed by the worker when he accepted the job. The risks 
included such accidents as those caused by fires, ex-
plosions, collapsing of buildings, the operation of old 
and defective machinery; as well as accidents resulting 
from the fault or negligence of a fellow-servant. It ~as 
this latter problem which caused so much suffering in 
the le.bar ranks, and against which employees have united 
and fought until they were able to get the necessary 
legislation for the abolishment of this old common law 
doctrine. 
The application of the old common law principle 
naturally caused the courts a great deal of.trouble in 
deciding where the actual liability should rest, prior 
to the adoption of specific laws passed in Virginia in 
1902. 
The question of the liability of the master to a ser-
vant for the negligence or misconduct of another servant 
was first suggested in an English case/ arising in 1837. 
In this case the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant 
who directed the plaintiff to go with another servant who 
w~~ driving the defendant's van, and the plaintiff was to 
take goods of the defendant. Doing as he was directed, the 
plaintiff was injured due to the breaking down of the van, 
which caused him to be thrown to the ground. The plaintiff 
claims that it became the duty of the defendant, on that 
occasion to use due. and proper care that the said van should 
be in a proper state of repair, that it should not be over-
loaded, and that the plaintiff should be safely and securely 
carried thereby. 
From the mere relations of master and servant, no con-
tract, and therefore no duty can be implied on the part of 
the master to cause the servant to be safely and securely 
carried or to make the master liable for damages to the 
servant, arising from any vice or· imperfection, unknown to 
the master, in the carriage, or in the mode of loading and 
conducting it. 
Neither can this relation im~ly an obligation on the 
part of the master to take more care of the servant than 
he may reasonably be expected to do for himself •. rhe servant 
is not bound to.risk his safety in the service of his master, 
and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he 
reasonably apprehends injury to himself; and in most cases 
in which danger may be incurred, if not in all, he is just 
as likely to be acquainted with the probability and extent 
of it as the master. 
The case was clearly one of equal knowledge on the part 
of the two servants, and of voluntary exposure by the plain-
tiff to a known hazard not required by his duty; and both 
servants were jointly engaged in the same business when the 
accident happened to the plaintiff. 
The general rule was thus established, that a master 
is not liable to his servant for damages caused by the neg-
ligence of a fellow-servant.~ 
This question of the liability of the master to a ser-
vant for the negligence or misconduct of another servant 
was first zpaturely considered in an American case; decided 
in 18.42, which has since been regarded both in Engla.nd and 
America as the leading case upon the subject.~ 
In this case a railroad company employed A, who was 
careful and trusty in his general character, to tend the 
switches on their road; and after he had been long in their 
service, they employed B, to run the passenger train of cars 
J.Ibid., p. 7. / 
~Fa!!!ell vs, :B, & Yh._Bl.,._QQ., 4 Mete. 49. 
Mechem, F. R., !_Treatise on the Law of Agen~, I,§ l:643 
on the road; B knowing the character and employment of A. 
Held, that the company was not answerable to B, for an in-
jury received by him, while running the cars, in consequence 
of the carelessness of A in the management of the switches. 
Chief Justice Shaw delivered the Judgement of the Court 
and he said: 
many 
He who engages in the employment of another, for 
the performance of specified duties and services for 
compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordi-
nary risks and perils incident to the performance of 
such services, and in legal presumption the compensa-
tion is adjusted accordingly. And we are not aware of 
a principle which should except the perils arising 
from the carelessness and negligence of those who are 
in the same employment. These are perils which the 
servant is likely to ~know, and against which he can 
as effectually guard, as the master. These are perils 
incident to the service, and which can be as distinctly 
foreseen and provided for in the rate of compensation 
as any others.s 
This view of the law had been generally accepted in 
of the states of the Union up until about 1900• ' 
Judge Shaw rests the exemption of the employer from 
liability to its servant occasioned by the negligence of 
a fellow-servant upon implied contract. The controlling 
reason of that decision is that a person entering the em-
ployment of another assumes all risks incident to that 
employment, including the danger of injury by the fault 
or negligence of a· fellow-servant. The difficulty which 
has been experienced is found in its application to par-
.s-4 Mete. 49. 
"N. & w. Rl.!_Qo. vs. Nuchols, 91 Va. 196. 
ticular cases, in determining who are and who are not 
fellow-servants, withiri the terms and meaning of the rule. 
And so, the Fellow-Servant Doctrine was first defined 
in America as follows: ''When a master uses due diligence 
in the selection of competent and trusty servants, and fur-
nishes them with suitable means to perform the service in 
which he employs them, he is not answerable to one of t~em, 
for an injury received by him in consequence of the care-
lessness of another while both are engaged in the .same ser-
vice.'' 7 
• 
Among the reasons given for the rule in this leading 
American case was that the servants, because of their asso-
ciation in the labor, were so situated that each could be 
an observer of the conduct of the others, could exert .in-
fluence over the others for securing his own safety and 
could give notice to the master of any misconduct, incapacity 
or neglect of duty on the part of his fellow-servant. S 
It was also contended in this case that where the mas-
ter's business was an extensive one, the rule should only 
apply to those servants who were working together in the same 
general department. This rule was rejected in this case as 
impracticable of anplication, but a number of courts have 
made it the basis of a distinction.' 
,/ 1 4 Mete. 49. ,, 
~Mechem, Age!!_£~, I,~ 1649. 
1 Ib~d., § 1651 
It was distinctly brought out in this case of Farwell 
vs. B. & w. Railroad Company, that although they, namely A 
and B, are employed to perform separate duties and services, 
they are employed to accom~lish the one and same purpose, 
that of the safe and rapid transmissions of the trains. 10 
It is an established fact that the aim of all the stat-
utes concerning railroads is to protect the passengers; the 
principle of the doctrine is to increase the caution of rail-
road servants, and thus decrease the risk of the passengers.'' 
However, some of the first cases in Virginia were not 
''fellow-servant'' cases within the meaning of that phrase, and 
may be considered as exceptions to the doctrine already laid 
down. 
Among these exceptions was the case of Moon's Adm'r. vs • 
. 
R & A R C 11 Th" . h" h th • • y. ompany. · is was a case in w ic e rear 
brakeman of a train was injured by the negligence of the 
section master, who was making repairs upon the track, upon 
which the dirt had not been filled in and firmly packed, but 
only ''tamped,'' and who failed to signal the approaching train, 
which in passing over the track in ·its unsafe condition, was 
derailed, and the brakeman was caught under the wreck, and 
died from the injuries thus received. The court held that his 
administrator was entitled to recover, and in its opinion 
10 4 Mete. 49.J 
'
1 Ibid., u. 53 
''-78 Va. 745. 
says that, "the section-master was not a fellow servant of 
the brakeman, and that the defendant company was liable for 
t~e injuries occasioned to the brakeman by the section-
master's negligence." 
In another case 13 the question whether or not the ''neg-
ligent employee was a co-employee of the party injured or 
was the representative of the defendant company,'' was a 
question of mixed law and fact, and would also be considered 
. 
an exception as the principle could have no application to 
the fellow-servant doctrine. 
Then in 1887 a workman, Mr. Norment, was employed by a 
railroad company, at its-depot yards, as an "overhauler," 
to assist in fixing up cars needing repairs. On the day he 
received the injury, he was required to put a drawbar spring 
into the end of a certain car which stood on a ''branch track.'' 
It became necessary for Norment to get under the damaged car, 
and while so situated another car was shifted on the branch 
track, and driven against the car which was in front of the 
car upon which he and his assistant were at work, by which 
it, in turn, was driven against the car upon which Norment was 
at 'Nork, and his hand was caught and greatly injured/¥-
It appears th.at there was no repair track in the com-
pany's yard; -s-e- that such repair track was necessary; that 
the company knew it to be necessary and had them elsewhere; 
that it not only failed to provide a repair track, but failed 
13B. & o. ~ Co. vs. McKenzie, 81 Va. 71. (1885) 
14& & D~, Co •• .!~. -!£!;!!~~' 84 Va. 167. 
al so to provide signal flags. l'he Court held, ''that Norment 
was not of the same grade, or in the same line of duty, as 
the engineer, or the conductor of the shifting engine, nor 
was he under the orders of either of them, and that the case 
was controlled by that of 78 Va. 745 and the liability of 
the railroad company was again assented; the exact point de-
cided being that an overhauler engaged in the repair of the 
company's cars is not a fellow-servant with the conductor 
and engineer in the employment of the same company, engaged 
in moving cars in the same depot yard, by the negligent per-
formance of whose duties the accident was sustained.'' l'he 
Court laid much stress upon the fact that the defendant 
company had failed to provide suitable appliances for the 
protection of its workers, in that it had not furnished a 
repair track and signal flags. 1S 
The last of these early Virginia cases which may be 
considered as exceptions to the Fellow-Servant Doctrine was 
one which arose out of the same state of facts considered 
in the case 78 Va; 745. The Court says, ''that the defendant 
company is liable for the negligence of its employees whose 
duty it was to repair the road and give notice of its con-
dition, and those employees were not fellow-servants of the 
plaintiff's intestate."'' 
Just why these cases were made exceptions to the general 
is 1. bi d. , p • 16? et seq • 
''!orian's Adm'r vs. RL & A, R~. Co., 84 Va. 192. (1887) 
doctrine may be laid to the belief that the master's busi-
ness was so extensive that the rule was made only to apply 
to those servants who were working together in the same 
general department.1'1 
It has been frequently attempted by employers to obtain 
from their employees, at the time of entering upon the ser-
vice and in consideration of it, a waiver of the liability 
of the master for injuries tha~ may happen through the neg-
ligence of the master or of the other servants. Such waivers, 
however, are quite generally held to be opposed to public 
policy and void. J'i 
The Fellow-Servant Doctrine was defined in 1842 but it 
was not until 1892 that the general doctrine was fully and 
broadly accepted in Virginia, and in this particular case 
the court was unanimous.'~ 
"This case repudiates the exceptions, and evinces a dis-
position to return to the simple terms of the rule stated by 
Chief Justice Shaw." It throws aside the doctrine of "infer-
ior and superior,'' of "gradations in employment," and of 
''separate departments," and states forcibly and clearly that 
.. 
"all serving a common master, working under the same control, 
deriving authority and compensation from the same source, 
and engaged in the same general business, although in differ-
ent grades or departments, are fellow-servants, and take the 
risks of each others negligence.v10 
This case further shows that probably the first four 
_Virginia cases should have been held within the rule and 
not considered as exceptions. This new view will be taken 
up more· thoroughly in a discussion of a later case. 
Another technical point in regard to the liability of 
the master to the servant was cleared up in the case of 
Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co. vs. Thomas, when it was decided that 
if the master has been guilty of actionable negligence, the 
fact that the negligence of a fellow-servant contributed 
will not defeat the servant's right of recovery against the 
master. J.I 
In any discussion of the Fellow-Servant Doctrine, the 
case 91 Va. 193 is the one most frequently cited to define 
the Virginia view of the doctrine and it is the leading case 
which accepts the old view of this doctrine and also shows 
that the early Virginia cases should have been held within 
the rule. 
In this case of the administrator of G. v. Nuckols 
against the Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., to recover damages 
for the death of his intestate, alleged to have been occa-
sioned by the negligence of the defendant company, Nuckols 
was employed as a track hand by the defendant company, and 
upon the morni~g of the accident which resulted in his 
.2"Refer to N. & W, Ry;. Co. v~ Nuckol's Adm'r,, 91 Va .• 206. 
1 t90 Va. 205. 
death, was engaged, along with others, in placing a. ra.il 
upon the· track of the defendant company, when he wa.s struck. 
by a passing engine drawing one of the trains of the defend-
ant, and died in a short time from the injuries received. 
In rendering a decision, the court's object was to 
seek a pla.in rule regulating and controlling some, at least, 
of the most important relations between railway companies 
a.nd their employees. There are interested in the solution 
of this problem the employees, as a cla.ss, and not merely 
those who have been or may be injured, the employer and the 
public. The court's view was that the particular rule is, 
in its application, always invoked by the employer to de-
feat the demands of the injured employee, but it does not 
at all prove that the employees, as a class, are not great-
ly benefitted by it. The number of those injured by the 
negligence of their fellow-servants is verY. great, but the 
proportion they bear to the whole number of employees is 
very small. If the rule, while operating to the disadvantage 
of the injured few, promotes the safety of the far greater 
number of those who sustain no injuries by introducing a 
salutary superintendence over each other among the servants 
of the company, then the rule, while beneficial to the em-
ployer, is not less so to the em~loyee; for that which pro-
motes immunity from danger is more to be desired than the 
pecuniary compensation for the injured could be, and being 
promotive also of the efficiency of the service, is obviously 
in the interest of the public.Jl 
Naturally, there must be some obligation put upon the 
master to make the rule fair to the careful and competent 
employee and so there is a duty imposed upon him. This duty 
forces the master to exercise caution and discretion in the 
selection of the servants who are to be ''fellows,'' and mu-
tually responsible to each other, a.nd he, the master, must 
not retain in his service any one found to be unfitted to 
discharge the duties assigned him. In the due performance 
of this duty by the master, the employees, as a class, and 
the public at large, are deeply interested; and the effect 
of the rule is to make it to the interest of the employees 
to keep the employer advised as to the habits, character, and 
qualifications of the ;fellow-servants.13 
It was practically impossible to dra.w a hard and fast 
line delimiting the liability of the employer,·and so, in 
this case, the judge offered the following proportions, which 
were fully warranted by the great weight of authority in this 
State and elsewhere:Lf 
1. A'person entering the service of another assumes 
all risks naturally incident to that employment, includ-
ing the danger of injury by the fault or negligence of 
a fellow servant. 
2. The liability does not depend upon the fact that 
the servant injured may be in a different department of 
the service from the wrong doer. The test is, were the 
departments so-far separated from each other as to ex-
clude the probability of contact, and of danger from the 
1291 Va. 205. 
2Jibid 
- . 
l'} !bid.' p. 207. 
negligent performance of their duties by em~loyees 
of the different departments? If they are so separated, 
then the servant is not to be deemed to have contracted 
with reference to the negligent performance of the 
duties of his fellow-servant in such other department. 
3. The liability does not depend upon gradations 
in employment, unless the superiority of the person caus-
ing the injury was such as to put him in the8 category of 
principal or vice-principal. 
4. It is the duty of the employer to furnish suit-
able and safe appliances, machinery, structure, and road-
way. 
5. It is the duty of the employer to exercise reason-
able care, prudence and discretion in ascertaining the 
character, habits and fitness of his employees for the 
discharge of the duties to be assigned to them, and by 
proper supervision and superintendence, to keep himself 
informed as to the manner in which the duties intrusted 
to them are performed. 
6. When the injury to the serVa.nt has been occasioned 
by the default of a fellow-servant, concurring with the 
negligence of the master, the latter is liable a.s though 
he only were at fault. 
7. A track repairer and engineman, though in differ-
ent departments, are, by the very nature of their emoloy-
ment, brought into frequent contact, and the risk of neg-
ligence by one must, therefore, be considered to have 
been in contemplation of the other where service under 
the common master was accepted. 
These views of the Doctrine were prevalent in Virginia 
up until 1902 when the Fellow-Servant Doctrine was abolished 
as to steam railways engaged in ''intra-state'' commerce. For 
years the workingmen had been united in an effort to force 
the Virginia Legislature to abolish this worn out and anti-
, ' 
. .,~< '~ ·~ 
social doctrine, but the railroads were too strong and ft.a.- '" 
political influence kept the legislature from protecting the 
employees who were made to suffer under the existing doctrine. 
When this anti-social measure was defined its principle 
was to increase the caution of railroad servants, and thereby 
decrease the risks of the passengers. Yet, for all the good 
it was supposed to do the harm it brought about was far 
more excessive, as innocent employees often lost their 
lives and others were badly injured and their dependants 
never recovered anything from the railroads which were at 
fau;I. t. 
Since the case 91 Va. 193, the evil effect of the 
doctrine was felt more keenly by the employees and each 
case which was ruled a fellow-servant case made the em-
ployees, as a class, determined to have this beastly meas-
ure abolished. The principle of the thi.ng was all right 
but it was worthless when it abused the rights of the em-
ployees to so great an extent. 
As already stated, the evil effect was felt more be-
tween 1890 and 1902 than at any other time. The follmving 
cases cited will illustrate this statement, but the courts 
could offer no remedies because there was no legislation 
on the matter. 
In 1892 an engine-man, on a railroad locomative, was 
killed, without fault on his part, in a collision with 
another locomotive of the same railroad company. The col-
lision was occasioned wholly by the negligent misconstructi~n 
of a right-of-way order by the engine-man in charge of the 
colliding locomotive. Although the plaintiff's intestate was 
proven entirely innocent of any fault or negligence, his de-
pendants were not a.ble to recover since the two engine-men, 
though on different locomotives, were fellow-servants, and 
therefore the railroad was not held liable.is 
In another ca~e:~a nineteen year old boy who was em-
ployed as a brakeman for the railroad, had his arm so 
badly injured that it had to be amputated above the elbow. 
He was engaged in uncoupling cars at the time of injury 
which was due to the negligent driving back of a tr~in by 
the engineer or fireman of the train. But, as these two 
employees were fellow-servants of the brakeman injured, the 
company was not liable and the boy could not recover for 
his loss. 
In another instance, an employee, acting as conduct6r 
of a shifting crew upon its yard, was run over by one of 
the company's cars and died from the injuries received. Just 
because he was a fellow-servant of the engineer and. fireman 
of the crew, his administrator could not recover from the 
company for injury inflicted through their negligence. ii 
As late as 1903, the court ruled that a railroad com-
pany, under the law which existed in 1900, was not liable 
for an injury resulting from the escape of cars from a 
siding to the main track, and a resulting collision, where 
the escape was due to the cars being displaced and set 
adrift by contact with shifting cars, resulting from the 
negligence of fellow-servants.Ji 
From these cases alqne, the injustice of this antique 
doctrine is brought out clearly and its evil effect was 
felt by the ent~re working class. So, when the employees 
grew strong enough to bring pressure on the legislature 
they had this anti-social and d~maging doctrine abolished, 
thereby putting the liability of future injuries on the 
masters of the railroads. 
Thus, after repeated efforts, this abrogation has, to 
a certain extent, been finally effected in Virginia--an 
innovation which England and most of the states have for 
years deemed absolutely essential to meet modern social 
and industrial condi tions.1" It is probably a.dvisable to 
quote verbatim and in full, not only the Article of the 
Constitution, but also the Statute on this subject, becaus~, 
as will be observed, there is a decided discrepancy between 
them. 30 
Virginia Constitution--Article XII. 
Sec. 162. The doctrine of fellow-servant, so far 
as it affects the liability of theIIla.ster for injuries 
to his servant, resulting from the acts or omissions of 
any other servant or servants of the common master, is, to 
the extent hereinafter stated, abolished as to every em-
ployee of a railroad company, engaged in the physical 
construction, repair or maintenance of its roadway, track 
or any of the structures connected therewith, or in any 
work in or upon a car or engine standing upon a track, or 
in the physical operation of a train, car, engine, or 
switch, or in any service requiring his ~resence upon a 
train, car or engine; and every such employee shall have 
the same right to recover from every injury suffered by him 
from the acts of omissions of any other employee or em-
ployees of the common master, that a servant would have, 
if such acts or omissions were those of the master himself 
-------
tf 8 Va 
- . 
so Ibid 
Law Reg. 24?. ('·/ I / 
--· 
\ 
in the performance of non assignable duty; provided, 
that the injury, so suffered by such railroad employee, 
result from the negligence of an officer, or agent of 
the company of a higher grade of service than himself, 
or from that of a person employed by the company, hav-
ing the right, or charged with the duty, to control or 
direct the general services of the immediate work of · 
the party injured, or the general sercices of the im-
mediate work of the co-employee through or by whose act 
or omission he is injured, or that it results from the 
negligence of a co-employee engaged in another depart-
ment of labor or engaged upon, or in charge of any car 
u-pon which, or upon the train of which it is a µart, 
the injured employee is not at the time receiving the 
injury, or who is in charge of any switch, signal point 
or locomotive engine, or is charged with dispatching 
trains or transmitting telegra~hic or telephonic orders 
therefor and whether such negligence be in the perform-
ance of an assignable or non-assignable duty. The physi-
cal consturction, repair or maintenance of the railway, 
track or any if the structures connected therewith, and 
the physical construction, repair maintenance, cleaning 
or operation of trains, cars, or engines shall be re-
garded as different departments of labor with the mean-
ing of this section. Knowledge by any such railroad em-
ployee injured, of the defective or unsafe character or 
condition of any machinery, ways, appliances or struc-
tures shall be no defense to an action for injury caused 
thereby. When death, whether instantaneous or not, re-
sults to such an employee from any injury for which he 
have recovered,· under the above nrovisioris, had death 
not occurred, then his legal or personal representative, 
surviving consort and relatives (and any trustee, curator, 
committee, o-r guardian of such consort or relatives) 
shall, respectively, have the same rights and remedies 
with respect thereto as if his death had been caused by 
the negligence of a co-employee while in the performance, 
as vice-principal of a non-assignable duty of the master. 
Every contract or agreement. express or implied, made by 
an employee, to waive the benefit of this section, shall 
be null and void. This section shall not be construed to 
deprive any employee or his legal or personal represen-
tative, surviving consort or relatives (or any trustee, 
curator, committee or guardian of such consort or rela-
tive), of any rights or remi!dies tha:t he or they may 
have by the law of the land, at the time this constitu-
tion goes into effect. Nothing contained in this section 
shall restrict the power of the general assembly to 
further enlarge, for the above-named class of employees, 
the rights and remBdies herein before provided for, or 
to extend such rights and remtdies to, or otherwise en-
large the pr.esen t rights and remtdi es of any other class 
of employees of railroads or of employees of any 
person, firm or corporation. 
Acts 1901-2. 
Sec. 1294 K. An Act imposing upon railroad 
corporations liability for injury to their employees 
in certain cases. 
(Approved March 27, 1902.) 
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, 
That every corporation operating a railroad in this State,. 
whether such corporation be created under the laws of 
this State or otherwise, shall be liable in damages 
for any and all injury sustained by an employee of such 
corporation as follows: 
When such injury results from the wrongful act, 
neglect, or default of an agent or officer of such cor-
pora ti on superior to the employee injured, or of a per-
son employed by such corporation having the right to 
control or direct the services of such employee injured, 
or the services of the employer by whom he is injured; 
and also when such injury results from the wrongful act, 
neglect, or default of a. co-employee engaged in another 
department of la.bor from that of the employee injured, 
or of a co-employee or another train of cars, or of a 
co-employee who has charge of a.ny switch, signal point, 
or locomotive engine, or who is charged with dispatching 
trains or transmitting telegraphic or telephoni orders. 
Knowledge by any employee injured of the d~fective and 
unsafe character or c8ndition of any machinery, ways, 
appliances, or structures of such corporation shall not 
of•itself be a bar to recovery for any injury or death 
caused thereby. When death, whether instantaneous or 
otherwise results from any injury to any employee of 
such corporation received as aforesaid, the personal 
representative of such employee shall have a right of 
action therefore against such corporation, and may re-
cover damages in respect thereof. Any contract or agree-
ment, express or implied, made by any such employee to 
waive the benefit of this section or any part thereof 
shall be null and void, and this section shall not be 
contrued to deprive any such employee, or his personal 
representative, of any right or remedy to which he is 
now entitled under the laws of this State. 
2. The rules and principles of law as to contributory 
negligence which apply to other cases shall apply to 
cases arising under this Act, except in so far as the 
same are herein modified or changed. 
3. This Act shall be in force from its passage. 
The provisions of the Constitution changing the old 
common law doctrine should be liberally construed, so as to 
give effect to the Constitutional policy and intent. Under 
these provisions of section 162, a railroad company is 
liable for an injury inflicted on an engineer of a moving 
train, occasioned by the failure of a telegraph operator 
of the co~pany to deliver to the conductor of such train a 
message from the train dispatcher • .31 
That section includes all agents of the company whose 
duty it is to transmit telegraphic or telephonic orders for 
the movement of trains to the conductors of such trains, no 
matter what instrumentalities may be employed for that pur-
pose.32. 
The case, in question, is about a locomotive engineer 
in the employment of the defendant company, who lost his 
life in a collision between two of the trains of that com-
pany, occasioned by the failure of its telegraph operator 
to transmit, or deliver, an order sent out from the train 
dispatcher's office to the conductor of one of the colliding 
trains. 
There can be no reason for holding that a train dis-
patcher is not a fellow-servant of the trainmen to be affected 
by the order, and the clause of section 162 abolishes the 
fellow-servant doctrine, so far as it affects the liability 
of the master for injuries to his servant resulting from the 
acts or omissions of a co-employee "charged with dispatching 
31Va. & $.·Ry. Co. vsJ!.Q!Y£~,LAdfil~·, 102 Va. 867 {1904). 
3.2.!.E.!.Q~' p. 868. 
trains or transmitting telegraphic or telephonic orders 
therefor." 
Therefore, the judgement was that the injured party 
should be able to recover. 3~ 
The effect of the Constitutional provisions, as was 
held in another case,5'1 was merely to abrogate the previously 
existing rule, which forbade the servant's recovery if he 
knowlngly used defective machinery, etc., and to declare 
that such knowledge, of itself, should not bar a recovery.3S 
The present constitution has also abolished the fellow-
servant doctrine in cases like this ;3 ' where a ya.rd master of 
a railroad company, who has no power to employ or discharge 
servants, but who directs the movements of trains on the 
yard, the shifting and changing of cars and the making up 
of trains, and who possesses none of the powers of a vice-
principal, was a fellow-servant of an engineer on the yard, 
and the company is liable for an injury inflicted on a yard 
master through the negligence of the engineer. 
If the presence of a ya.rd master on a switching engine 
is in the usual and proper discharge of his duties, he is 
rightfully there, and is entitled to the benefit of the pro-
tection afforded him by the constitutional provisions abol-




'1103 Va. 356., N. & !. Ry~..!-vs. Chea.tweed's Adm'r. 
3S"F, F. & P. ~Co, vs. Chichester Adm'r., 111 Va.-Y5?. 
3,Southern Ry. Co. vs. Smith, 107 Va. 553. 
in any service requiring his presence on a train, or 
engine. n 
In one instance, however, the provisions which abolish 
the doctrine of fellow-servant as to employees of railroad 
to not apply to employees of electric street railway com-
panies, but a.s to the latter, the common law fellow-servant 
doctrine still holds. The words "railroad company" as em-
ployed in section 162 were only intended to apply to rail-
roads proper or commercial railroads. "The language of the 
Constitution and of the Statute passed in pursuance thereof, 
and the history and rea.son of these provisions indicate that 
street railways were not intended to be embrased. ".JS 
The statutes which abolished the fellow-servant rule 
only with reference to railroads have been uniformly held 
cons ti tut ional a,ga inst content ions that they are founded 
on an 1orbitrary classification, a denial of equal protection 
of the laws, etc., on the ground that it is an occupation 
that is peculiarly and inherently hazardous.39 
On March 14, 1912 an act was passed and approved which 
amended and re-enacted the Virginia Employer's Liability 
Act of 1902, imposing upon railroad corporations liability 
for injury to their employees in certain cases:0 The original 
act was only amended to a slight degree and now states; (in 
.n Ibid. 
:fR,_~. P. !raction~~ Ellington's Adm'r., 108 Va. 245. 
'Q~Q_,_~. Co. vs. Hoffman, 109 Va. 44. 
<fOCode 1904, 9 1294-K. 
the amended portions only.} 
When such injury results from the wrongful act, neglect 
or default of an agent or officer •••••• ; and also when 
such injury results from the wrongful act, neglect, or 
default of a co-employee engaged in another department 
of labor from that of the employee injured, or a co-
employee (notwithstanding the fa.ct that the party injured 
had the right to direct the services of the co-employee) 
in the performance of any duty on or about the same or 
another train of cars, or on or about an engine, ••••• ~~' 
As a result, it was found in Cd. & o. Ry. Co. vs. Swartz, 
decided in 1914, that the duty owed by a railroad company to 
a car repairer to furnish him a reasonably safe place in which 
to work is non-assignable; and hence the omission of a hostler 
to discharge his duty relative to removing cars beneath which 
a car repairer was working constituted negligence for which 
the ra.i lroad company was liable, tho~gh the cars were actually 
moved by a fireman under the hostler's direction. 11-~ 
It was also decided at a later date in 1914 that a ser-
vant assumes all ordinary risks incident to the employment,· 
but not any risk as to primary duties i@posed on the master. f3 
In 1916 the legislature undertook to determine the lia-
bility of intrastate common carriers by railroads operated 
by steam for inju·ry to, or death of, employees. The Code thus 
reads: 
Every common carrier by railroad engaged in intra-
state commerce, whose motive ~ower is steam, shall be 
liable in damages to any of its employees suffering in-
jury while employed by such carrier, except when such 
emuloyee is injured while engaged in interstate commerce, 
and except.when such employees are injured in the course 
f/Acts 1912 have been omitted from Code 1919, and thereby 
repealed. 
f2.ll5 Va. 723. 
4.3Souther!l Ry. Co. vs. Jacobs, 116 Va. 189. 
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of their regular employment, which regular employ-
ment does not expose such employee to the hazards 
incident to the maintenance, use and operation of 
such railroads, and.in case of his death, to his 
personal representative, for such injury or death, 
resulting in the whole or in part from the wrongful 
act or neglect of any of its officers, agents, ser-
vants or employees of such carriers or by reason of 
any.defect or insufficiency due to its neglect in 
its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, 
road-bed, works, boats, ·wharves or other equipment.'' 44 
''By a resolution of. the General Assembly of 1916, a 
Commission was created by Henry Carter Stuart, Governor 
of Virginia, to study the advisability of adopting a 
Workmen's Compensation Act for the State. This Commission 
reported to the General Assembly of 1918. A law was enacted 
on 111a.rch 21, 1918, and became effective on January 1, 1919." '1-.r 
The purpose of the compensation law was to make the 
risk of the accident one of the industry itself, and that 
compensation resulting from such accidents should be treated 
as an element in the cost of production, added to the cost 
• 
of the article and therefore borne by the community in general.~' 
"The Workman's .:Compensation Act is said to be in th,e 
nature of a compromise between the employer and employee to 
settle their differences arising out of personal injuries, 
but is a compromise greatly to the advantage of the employee. 
By it the question of negligence of the employer is elimi-
nated, and the common law doctrine of assumption of risk, 
---·---
'l'fVa. Code, Sec. 5791. 
¥S'Deans;-ed., l'he Va. Workmen's Compe™li on Act, p. 3. 
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fellow-servants, and contributory negligence are abolished 
and the rules of evidence are laxly enforced; so laxly 
that an award may be made on hearsay evidence alone, if 
creditable and not contradicted. The relief afforded is 
fixed, certain and speedy and at a time when most needed. 
Under it there is no doubt or uncertainty as to the right 
of recovery of the amount thereof. The damage resulting 
from an accident is treated as a part of the expenses of 
the business and to be borne as such, as much as expenses 
of repairing a piece of machinery which has broken down.''~7 
"This act shall not apply to common carriers whose 
motive power is steam and engaged in intra-state trade or 
commerce, nor shall this act be construed to lessen the 
liability of such common carriers or to take away or di-
minish any right that any employee, or in the case of his 
death, the personal representative of such employee, of 
such common carrier may have, under the act of the General 
Assembly of Virginia, approved March 21, 1916, (which has 
already been stated, above.) or under the act of March 14, 
1912, nor to ca.sual employees, farm and horticultural la-
borers and domestic servants nor to employees of such per-
sons, nor to any person~ firm, or private corporation, in-
eluding an~ ~ublic service corporation, that has regularly 
in service less than eleven operatives in the same business 
within this State; unless such employees and their employers 
voluntarily elect to be bound by this act.f~ 
"An employer who elects not to operate under this act 
shall not in any suit at law instituted by an employee sub-
ject to .this act to recover damages .for personal injuries 
or death by accident, be permitted to defend any such suit 
at law upon any or all of the following grounds:~9 
(1.) That the employee was_negligent. 
(2). That the injury was caused by the negligence of a 
fellow-employee. 
(3.) That the employee had assumed the risk of injury. 
Th~ act also states that "an employee who elects not 
to operate under this act shall, in any action to recover 
damages for personal injury or death brought against an em-
ployer accepting the compensation provisions of this act, 
proceed at common law, and the employer may avail himself 
of the defenses of contributory negligence of a fellow-
servant and assumption of risk, as such defenses exist at 
common law. 11 .;o 
Also, "when both the employer and employee elect not to 
operate under this act, the liability of the employer shall 
be the same as though he alone rejected the terms of this 
act, and in any suit brought against him by such employee the 
employer shall not be permitted to avail himself of any of 
nrbid., p. 51; sec. 15 
'f9Ibid., p. 56; sec. 16. 
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the common law defenses," cited in the above section.s/ 
And so, from these sections of the Workman's Com-
pensation Act which refer to fellow servants, it is seen 
that although the Act abolishes the old common law doc-
trine under certain other circumstances, not all, it is 
still possible for the employer, in certain instances, to 
get out of his liability as stated in the Com~ensation 
Act and thus place himself and the employee back in the 
' 
same position as they were when the Fellow-Servant Doctrine 
was held just. 
No further legislation has been passed concerning the 
fellow servants and so, generally speaking, the fellow 
servant doctrine is considered fully abolished in most all 
cases. 
f1Ibi£., p. 57; sec. 18. 
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